








This article discusses links between the political theories and ideas of medieval and modern 
Islamists, showing how the latter is a continuation of the former’s writings. It also shows how 
episodes of Islamist thought have coincided with both external conflicts with non-Muslim powers and 
internal ones with local regimes. 
 
Political Islamism has often, though not 
always, been treated as a relatively new 
phenomenon. By the same token, 
examinations of Medieval Islamic political 
thought, like those of Montgomery Watt and 
Ann Lambton, look at this factor in its own 
historical context.1 There are exceptions, of 
course, as with Hrair Dekmejian who studied 
the historical cyclic responses of radical 
Islamism,2 while Antony Black has traced the 
broad history of Islamic political thought.3 
What is both interesting and useful at present 
is to take a broader view of Islamist political 
thinking over time and the relationship 
between various waves of its development. 
Researchers identify very different 
contributory factors, including a response to 
economic crises or social dislocation; a 
reaction to authoritarianism; national shame 
stemming from Arab military defeats; crises of 
national identity, quests for national 
authenticity; the desire for legitimating 
authority; and disillusionment with the failures 
of Western-inspired government (whether 
liberal democratic or Soviet-influenced) to 
deal with their societies’ problems.4 
One scholar states that Islamism is a 
product of “the failure of authoritarian 
nationalist governments, and the socio-
economic divisions that have been exacerbated 
by neo-liberal globalization.”5 Another view is 
propounded by Nazih Ayubi, who asserts that 
present-day Islamism does not represent a 
return to any situation that existed in the past 
or to any former theories but, rather, “is a new 
invention.”6 Samir Amin claims that Islamists 
are not interested in theology and never refer 
to the classical theologians, and in a similar 
vein Bassam Tibi argues that notions of the 
“Islamic state” and “God’s rule” are recent 
additions to Islamic thought.7 
To evaluate these various interpretations, 
this article reviews the writings of traditional 
Islamists and compares them with the concepts 
and approaches used by twentieth-century 
Islamists. These are important issues. To 
understand better the new phenomenon it is 
necessary to unravel the historical roots of 
Islamism and extremism, a heritage which is 
very much connected to present-day ideas and 
movements. 
Economic factors (such as poverty) and 
sociopolitical factors (such as democracy and 
political legitimacy) have historically 
contributed to the emergence of Islamism. 
This article argues, however, that perceived 
military and cultural invasions have been the 
primary causes of Islamism and extremism 
both past and present. Evidence for this lies in 
the coincidence of past waves of Islamism 
with such events. It should be noted, of course, 
that such developments are common in 
regional history--and did not always produce 
this reaction--and thus these factors alone do 
not explain the phenomenon but they are of 
great significance in its timing and shaping. 
Listed chronologically, some of the most 
extreme Islamists included Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 
(780-855), Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-
1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292- 1350), 
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Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), 
Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), Abul A’la 
Mawdudi (1903-1979), and Sayyid Qutb 
(1906-1966). The element common to all of 
these writers was their hostility to the military 
and/or cultural invasions of their time. 
For Ibn Hanbal, the Mu’tazila movement of 
that period was a rationalist ideology 
stemming from Greek philosophy, and as 
such, he perceived it to be a serious challenge 
to Muslim orthodoxy (see below for details). 
Four centuries later the Mongol invasion 
prompted Ibn Taymiyya and his student, Ibn 
Qayyim, to preach extreme ideas. Similarly, 
the primary concern for Mawdudi (leader of 
the Jamaat-e-Islami organization) and al-
Banna (head of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood) was the desire to rid Egypt and 
India of British domination.8 More recently, 
Muslim nations have experienced early 
twentieth-century colonization by European 
powers, the Palestine issue, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and the U.S.-led 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; in each of 
these cases the emergence of Islamism is quite 
evident. 
Invasions--whether military or cultural--are 
seen by Islamists as evil forces supplanting 
true Muslim religious and cultural values. In 
addition to military and cultural invasions, it is 
argued here that the harsh treatment of Muslim 
ulama and activists at the hands of authorities 
has been yet another contributing factor in the 
production of extreme ideas and writings. As 
noted above, poverty, illiteracy, injustice, and 
the absence of democracy provide conditions 
which make extremist ideas more readily 
acceptable to frustrated people. 
The word Islamism here includes any 
attempt by Muslim individuals or movements 
to use Islam’s main sources, the Koran, the 
Sunna, and Islamic jurisprudence, as the 
foundations for political theories and 
ideologies. The term Islamist is used here to 
refer to Muslim activists in the political sphere 
who seek a religiously based government and 
policies in governance. 
LINKS BETWEEN TRADITIONALIST 
AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAMISTS 
 
The link and/or parallel between these two 
groups will be investigated on the basis of 
such common concepts as salafiyya (return to 
predecessors); sovereignty; 
comprehensiveness and universalism; forms of 
Islamic government, state and religion; jihad; 
takfir (repentance); and the status of women 
and non-Muslims in Islam. The persecution 
that individual Islamists have experienced and 
the sociopolitical issues that Islamists and 
their communities have faced (such as cultural 
and military invasions) will also be explored 
to identify the development patterns of Islamic 
extremism. Similarities will be explored 
regarding possible links and/or parallels 




Salafiyya is a call for “a return to true 
Islam” as practiced by the first generation of 
Muslims in the seventh century. Advocates of 
salafiyya believe that only by returning to the 
“true Islam” of the salaf (ancestors) can 
Muslims fight the immorality, foreign values 
and practices, and domination by others. Both 
types of Islamists argue that past solutions 
should be implemented to address 
contemporary problems, based on the 
authority of tradition, and they look to the 
salaf’s practices and texts as being sacred and 
equal to the main Islamic sources.9 
Traditional Islamists: Abu Hamid al-
Ghazali (1058-1111) argues that a caliphate is 
an indispensable institution of Muslim life and 
is “demanded by the ijmaa (consensus) of the 
community.”10 Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) 
expressed the view that a caliphate was 
necessary because Muhammad’s Companions 
and the second generation of Muslims saw it 
to be necessary.11 By the same token, Ibn 
Taymiyya insisted on the implementation of 
Shari’a (Islamic laws), and he called it the 
project of Islam. He believed that it had 
originally been achieved by the righteous 
caliphs and that it could be achieved again, 
though it would require other instruments.12 
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Contemporary Islamists: Mawdudi, who 
could be considered the father of this group, 
argues that no mujtahid (qualified person on 
theological matters in Islam) should ever lose 
sight of--or proceed independently of--the 
guidance given by the four Muslim jurists: 
Hanafi (699-767), Maliki (716-795), Shafi’i 
(767-820) and Hanbali (780-855).13 Similarly, 
Qutb suggests that Muslims will not be 
masters of their own destiny unless they walk 
in the footsteps of the first generation of 
Muslims.14 Likewise, Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
(1926- ) stresses the same line and says that 
individuals cannot interpret the Koran as they 
wish, but should apply principles and 
fundamentals compiled by previous religious 
leaders.15 
In light of these and other views they have 
held, it is clear that both traditional and 
contemporary Islamists regard the acts and 
practices of the four “rightly guided” caliphs 
(Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) and the 
first and second generations of Muslims as 
another source of their political theories and 
view them as shining models of ideal Muslim 
rulers and believers. For example, the 
appointment of a caliph is regarded as an 
essential part of Islamist political theory and is 
based on what is called the ijmaa of 
Muhammad’s companions. This is evident in 
al-Ghazali’s argument on the necessity of the 
caliphate, for he believes that a caliphate is 
necessary because “it is of advantage and 
keeps away damage in the world.” He stresses 
that a caliphate “is an indispensable institution 
of Muslim life.”16 
The ijmaa of Muhammad’s companions 
has similar significance for the two groups. 
Both al-Ghazali and al-Qaradawi argue that 
the appointment of a caliph for the salaf was 
more important than the burial of 
Muhammad’s body.17 Both sides show 
deference to tradition, this being important 
because, as pointed out by John Hawley, 
within all religions there are powerful 
traditions which emphasize stories, narratives, 
personalities, and lives instead of codes, 
precepts, and lectures.18 Both traditional and 
contemporary Islamists adopted this 
methodology to elaborate their ideas, and their 
writings are embellished with stories and 
narratives of the salaf. 
 
Sovereignty and Authority 
 
Though the exact definition of sovereignty 
has varied across history, it has the core 
meaning of supreme authority within a 
territory. A government is sovereign in that its 
institutions have the power to set the laws and 
regulations in the territory it rules as it wishes, 
within the context of previous state law. It is at 
this point that the modern concept of 
sovereignty clashes with notions of 
sovereignty as understood by Islamists. 
Islamists such as Mawdudi, Qutb, Khomeini 
and Shari’ati have argued that “the basic 
distinction between Western polity and 
Islamic polity is that while the former places 
sovereignty in either the state or in man 
through the notion of popular sovereignty, the 
latter places it absolutely in God.”19 Modern-
day Islamists assert that all sovereignty stems 
from God, and the contemporary use of the 
concept of God’s sovereignty started after the 
clash between the then Egyptian and Pakistani 
authorities and the representatives of the 
Islamist movements, such as Jamaat-e-Islami 
in Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt. 
However, the concept of the sovereignty of 
God is not something new in the Islamist 
lexicon and has been used by traditional 
Islamists for centuries. 
Traditional Islamists: Al-Ghazali stresses 
the concept of the absolute sovereignty of 
God, and he considers the sovereignty of God 
to be even more important than God’s unity.20 
Yet he was not the only one to use the concept 
of sovereignty, for after the collapse of the 
Abbasid Caliphate in 1258, it was no longer 
possible for Islamists, like Ibn Taymiyya, to 
promulgate the fiction of the obligatory nature 
of a universal caliphate as his predecessors 
had done. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya sought a 
new foundation for the state, starting from the 
basis that absolute sovereignty belongs to 
God. For Ibn Taymiyya, the only source of 
sovereignty and authority is God. According 
to this doctrine, Muslims consider God to be 
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the absolute leader because, as Ibn Taymiyya 
argues, the will of God was passed to 
Muhammad through a revelation and so must 
be treated as a divine law. Thus, God is the 
sole bearer of sovereignty.21 
Contemporary Islamists: Mawdudi has 
stated the view that God is the sole sovereign 
over all creatures,22 and he has subsequently 
been supported by Qutb who insists on “no 
sovereignty except God’s, no law except from 
God, and no authority of one man over 
another, as the authority in all respects belong 
to God.”23 Furthermore, he suggests, 
“Without… the concept of a higher authority 
(God’s sovereignty), all values remain 
unstable.”24 This approach to the concept of 
sovereignty, by Sunni Islamists, is identical to 
that of the Shi’a, the Iranian Shi’a leaders, 
even incorporating it into their national 
constitution, which states, “absolute 
sovereignty over the world and man belongs to 
God.”25 The issue of sovereignty is very 
important to Muslim theologians. Ibn al-
Muqaffa (724-759) insisted that if a 
government does not implement the 
requirements revealed in the Koran and Sunna, 
it does not merit obedience.26 Indeed this 
question has been of central significance since 
the establishment of the Islamic faith, for 
instance during the turbulent debates between 
Mu’tazilis and Orthodoxies.27 It reached a 
critical point, with Ibn Hanbal asserting that 
one “should only obey rulers who observe the 
correct religious regulations.”28 Thereafter, 
Ibn Khaldun argued on similar lines; he 
stressed that if a religious state is not operating 
according to the rule of the Shari’a then 
subjects are under no obligation to give their 
allegiance to such a government.29 
After nearly seven hundred years, Mawdudi 
used exactly the same argument against 
political authorities in the Indian subcontinent 
when he called on Muslims to disobey any 
laws that are not from God as He is the only 
legislator.30 It has been argued that Mawdudi 
and Qutb were the first to use the concept of 
hakimiyya ilahiyya (God’s sovereignty), but 
this was clearly not the case, for as early as the 
reign of Ali (the fourth caliph, r. 656-661), the 
Khawarijis (literally “those who go out”)31 
were using the slogan “la hukm illa li-llah” 
(the judgment is God’s alone)--meaning that 
all political decisions must be based on the 
words of God.32 
In light of the above discussion, it is 
apparent that the concept of God’s sovereignty 
was introduced and used by traditional 
Islamists long before its use by contemporary 
Islamists and for an almost identical political 
purpose. 
 
Comprehensiveness and Universalism; the 
Superiority of Islam 
 
In the religious context, universalism is a 
theological doctrine that all human beings 
eventually will be saved. For Islamists, 
salvation will come only by Islam. Islamists 
argue this because of their belief in Islam’s 
comprehensive nature. The question to be 
considered in this section is not the claim of 
the comprehensive nature of Islam but to 
determine whether both groups of Islamists 
have assumed that Islam incorporates the 
concepts of comprehensiveness and 
universality.33 This will shed further light on 
the links between traditional and 
contemporary Islamist political theories. 
Traditional Islamists: Ibn Taymiyya argues 
that Islam is superior to the other two revealed 
religions (Judaism and Christianity) because 
the latter proclaim religion without striving to 
achieve “the conditions necessary for its 
existence: power, jihad, [and] material 
resources.”34 Furthermore, he believes that the 
political organization of the Muslim 
community “is superior to that of any state.”35 
Ibn Khaldun, like Ibn Taymiyya, believes in 
the superiority of Islam over other divinely 
revealed religions, and in his well-known 
book, The Muqaddimah, he states: 
 
In the Muslim community, the holy 
war is a religious duty, because of the 
universalism of the Muslim mission 
and the obligation to convert everyone 
to Islam either by persuasion or by 
force…. The other religious groups did 
not have a universal mission, and the 
holy war was not a religious duty to 
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them, save only for the purpose of 
defence.… They [Christians and Jews] 
are merely required to establish their 
religion among their own people.36 
 
Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun places Muslim 
religious laws above all other laws because he 
believes them to be more comprehensive, as 
they touch both worldly and spiritual affairs.37 
This notion of superiority was endorsed by 
Abd al-Wahhab (who can be considered a 
bridge between traditional and contemporary 
Islamists) who asserted that the Islamic umma 
(nation) represented the pinnacle of excellence 
in comparison to other religions.38 
Contemporary Islamists: According to 
Mawdudi, Islam has defined and established 
essential universal rights not only for Muslims 
but for humanity as a whole. On this basis, 
then, he encouraged “revivalists” to initiate a 
universal movement. He pointed out that the 
aim of such a movement is to enable Islam to 
become a superpower and a cultural 
hegemonic force to capture the moral and 
intellectual political leadership of mankind.39 
In addition, neo-Islamists believe that Islamic 
principles and practices are capable of solving 
all of the problems of human life. They argue 
that the Islamic system extends into all aspects 
of life; it discusses all minor and major affairs 
of mankind; it provides order to human affairs; 
it is not only comprehensive and perfect, but 
also realistic and constructive.40 
This comparison of the views of 
traditionalists and neo-Islamists demonstrates 
a strong link between early and contemporary 
Islamists in their approach to the concepts of 
universalism and comprehensiveness. The 
acceptance of the comprehensive and 
universalistic nature of Islam led them to 
believe in the superiority of their faith over all 
others. For example, Qutb insists that “all 
humanity is in need to us; to our beliefs; to our 
principles; to our laws and our system.”41 He 
states that it is the duty of Islam to annihilate 
all other systems because they are not only 
obstacles in the way of universal freedom, but 
also other societies do not give Muslims any 
opportunity to organize according to their own 
methods.42 
Similar arguments can be seen in the 
writings of leading Iranian Shi’a figure, 
Ayatollah Mutahhari, who sees Islam as 
superior to other religions. He dismisses 
Christianity as comprising merely a few moral 
teachings while Islam is “a religion that sees 
its duty and commitment to form an Islamic 
state. Islam came to reform society and to 
form a nation and government. Its mandate is 
the reform of the whole world.”43 For 
Islamists, Islam is not only a religion, it is a 
comprehensive system to govern all public, 
social, and political life. 
 
The Necessity of Islamic Government 
 
Before exploring the links between 
traditional and contemporary Islamists in 
regard to the necessity of an Islamic 
government and social order, several points 
need to be clarified. First, this is a very 
important subject because it is one of the basic 
principles used by Islamists to politicize their 
faith. Second, it is essential to note that the 
terminology used by traditionalists and that 
used by contemporary Islamists is slightly 
different. For example, traditional Islamists 
used caliphate or imamate as the main political 
and religious institutions in the Islamic state, 
while contemporary Islamists have adopted 
modern terms such as “state” and 
“parliament.” 
Traditional Islamists: Ali bin Muhammad 
al-Mawardi (974-1058) stated that “God… 
ordained the caliphate of the Prophet through 
whom He protected the people; and He 
entrusted government to him, so that the 
management of affairs should proceed [on the 
basis of] right religion… and affairs of 
common interest were made stable.”44 
Regarding the necessity of government, Ibn 
Taymiyya (in his political treatise al-Siyyasa 
al-Shar’iyya) bases his argument on two 
verses in the Koran. The first verse reads, 
“Surely Allah commands you to make over 
trusts to their owners and that when you judge 
between people you judge with justice; surely 
Allah admonishes you with what is excellent; 
surely Allah is Seeing, Hearing.” The second 
verse is: “Oh you who believe! Obey Allah 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008) 73 
The Relationship Between Traditional and Contemporary Islamist Political Thought 
 
and obey the Messenger and those in authority 
from among you; then if you quarrel about 
anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, 
if you believe in Allah and the last day; this is 
better and very good in the end.”45 
For Ibn Taymiyya, governing the affairs of 
the Muslim community is a religious 
requirement, because religion--without control 
of government--cannot survive, and he 
believes that the exercise of authority is a 
religious function.46 Enforcing Islamic law is 
seen by Ibn Taymiyya to be another reason for 
an Islamic form of government, and he bases 
this on the belief that God ordered the Muslim 
community to “enjoin the good and forbid 
evil.” He says, “People are in need of a book 
to guide them, and a victorious sword; the 
book represents justice and the sword 
represents force, and human life depends on 
both of them.”47 Another traditionalist, Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292- 1350) also argued 
that politics is part of religion, and government 
is founded on the justice of God and 
Muhammad.48 
Contemporary Islamists: Fear of waning 
Islamic values and the need for Shari’a are 
seen by neo-Islamists as the main reasons for 
having an Islamic state. Without a state, Qutb 
argues, all values are unstable, and similarly 
the morals based on those values remain 
unstable.49 More significantly, in regard to the 
links and similarities between contemporary 
Islamist political theory and traditional 
Islamist political ideas, al-Qaradawi and Abd 
al-Karim Zedan, two leading contemporary 
Islamist theoreticians, have used the same 
argument espoused by Ibn Taymiyya to justify 
the establishment of Islamic government (see 
above).50 
It is clear from the above passages that both 
traditional and contemporary Islamists believe 
that the establishment of an Islamic state is 
vital because, as they claim, the existence of 
religion and the world are both dependant on 
the existence of a government, or more 
precisely, an Islamic order. This highlights 
another parallel between the political theory of 
traditional and neo-Islamists and is an 
indication that the process of politicization of 
Islam is an old phenomenon. In the next 
section this argument will be further 
illustrated. 
 
State and Religion: Politicization of Islam 
 
Both traditional and neo-Islamists believe 
in the inseparability of state and religion. In 
the following section this concept is not 
debated, however, their respective notions of 
state and religion, and the conditions that have 
been laid down for Islamic rule by both 
traditional and contemporary Islamists, will be 
examined for possible links. 
Traditional Islamists: Al-Mawardi and Ibn 
Taymiyya identified the duties of the caliph as 
follows: to maintain the religion, to execute 
judgment between claimants, to protect the 
house of Islam, to implement Shari’a, to guard 
the frontiers, to undertake jihad, to appoint 
advisors, to collect taxes, to pay salaries, and 
to oversee community affairs personally, to 
lead the Friday prayer, the performance of 
pilgrimage, and the celebration of religious 
festivals.51 
It is obvious that for traditionalists the 
caliph and the institution of the caliphate are 
seen to be the bearers of all state duties--
legislative, executive, and judicial. It is 
noteworthy that of all these duties only a few 
are religious. Additionally, al-Ghazali adds as 
duties to be commander of the Muslim army 
and leader of all formal religious 
observances.52 As regards the qualifications 
for being appointed caliph, most traditionalists 
have stressed that he should be a just person, 
possess religious knowledge, and be able to 
make independent judgments on points of law; 
in other words, to be mujtahid. Also, he has to 
be a mature male and a Muslim.53 
In regard to the relationship between 
religion and state, in his major work on 
politics, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (The 
Ordinances of Government), al-Mawardi 
conceives of the caliphate as a form of 
government that safeguards the ordinances of 
the Shari’a and its implementation. Moreover, 
al-Ghazali also argued that religion and power 
were, from the beginning, “indissolubly 
interrelated.” In a similar vein, Ibn Taymiyya 
insists that state and religion are inseparable, 
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because their separation eventually leads to 
dissension.54 By the same token, Abd al-
Wahhab argues that Islam forbids “separating 
the religion from any matters of life, including 
politics and law.”55 
Contemporary Islamists: Concerning the 
question of state and religion, the only 
difference between contemporary Islamists 
and traditionalists is that the former use the 
term “Islamic state” instead of “caliphate”; but 
they, too, list the above-mentioned duties of 
caliph, including the need to safeguard the 
Muslim community and to implement 
Shari’a.56 Like the traditionalists, al-Qaradawi 
and al-Banna both argue that a Muslim ruler 
must be a scholar in Shari’a, and his 
knowledge of Islamic regulations needs to be 
equivalent to that of a mujtahid.57 
Likewise, Mawdudi identifies the 
qualifications for rulers and office bearers. He 
suggests that they have to possess those 
qualities prescribed by Islam, such as to be a 
Muslim, male, adult, and a citizen of an 
Islamic state.58 It is evident that the 
qualifications identified by contemporary 
Islamists are almost identical to those of 
traditional Islamists. However, it is relevant to 
point out that when Mawdudi says those 
“qualities prescribed by Islam,” he refers to 
the ones prescribed by traditionalists, because 
neither the Koran nor the Sunna defined the 
necessary qualities. 
  
Jihad and Takfir 
 
Takfir, or repentance, is the practice of 
declaring that an individual or a group 
previously considered Muslim(s) is/are in fact 
kufar (non-believers in God), and in some 
cases legalizing the shedding of their blood. 
Historically, takfir and hijra (migration) are 
terms that refer to when Muhammad 
considered the people of Mecca to be infidels, 
thus leaving the city and going to Medina 
instead. The recent use of these terms and 
concepts was introduced by an Egyptian 
radical organization, al-Takfir wal-Hijra 
(Repentance and Holy Flight), which accuses 
any society of being infidel if it does not 
follow the Shari’a--even if that society 
observes Islamic rituals. In the view of that 
organization, the only solution for believers is 
to flee the infidel community and call for jihad 
against it. 
Traditional Islamists: The concept of jihad 
has been used since the earliest years of the 
religion. Indeed, the use of jihad and takfir 
precedes the appearance of jurists, ulama, and 
traditional Islamists. For example, shortly after 
Muhammad’s death, the Khawarijis justified 
their fight against Caliph Ali, whom they 
considered to be an infidel because, they said, 
he transgressed Islamic precepts. They 
considered all non-Khawarijis (and even those 
Khawarijis who had not joined their camp) as 
mushrikun (polytheists) and kuffar (infidels).59 
A similar argument was developed by Ibn 
Taymiyya against the Tatars, for although that 
group had embraced Islam, he denounced 
them as apostates because they failed to 
implement fully the Shari’a. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
strict and literal interpretation of the Koran 
established him as the pioneer of Islamic 
extremism. He was one of the first Islamists to 
introduce the notion of migration from the 
House of Infidels to the House of Islam.60 He 
also believed that all lawful warfare was 
essentially jihad, and since its aim was to 
assert the supremacy of God’s word, those 
who stood in the way of this aim must be 
fought.61 
One of Ibn Taymiyya’s students, Ibn 
Qayyim, meticulously followed his teacher’s 
steps and, after the Khawarijis, was one of the 
first to introduce the concept of takfir and to 
set out a procedure for jihad. In his book Zad 
al-Mi’ad, he argues that: 
 
God Commanded the Prophet 
Muhammad to migrate to Medina. 
After his arrival into Medina, he was 
given permission to fight. Then he was 
instructed to fight against those who 
fought him and to restrain himself 
from those who did not make war with 
him. Later he was commanded to fight 
the polytheists until God’s religion was 
fully established.62 
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For traditionalists, jihad could be against 
infidels or believers. Both al-Mawardi and Ibn 
Taymiyya divided jihad into two categories: 
jihad against unbelievers and jihad against 
believers. The latter were further divided into 
apostates (or innovators), rebels, and 
brigands.63 In addition, he considered the 
Shi’a and those who doubted their version of 
Islam to be infidels. In a similar vein, Abd al-
Wahhab argued that the Shi’a beliefs and 
worships were forms of infidelity. Indeed, in 
terms of takfir, no Islamist is as extreme as 
Abd al-Wahhab. In his major book Kitab al-
Tawhid, he asserts that only those who 
subscribe to his version of religious orthodoxy 
are the true and faithful believers, and he 
dismisses almost everybody else--Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike--as infidels.64 From 
the above remarks, it is clear that both jihad 
and takfir were central to Islamist political 
arguments, and they were justified against 
both believers and non-believers. The question 
now is how neo-Islamists approached these 
two concepts and how much they relied on 
traditional theories. 
Contemporary Islamists: Qutb’s 
understanding of jihad is a precise copy of Ibn 
Qayyim’s approach (see above). Qutb stated 
that the Muslims were first restrained from 
fighting, then they were permitted to fight; 
later they were instructed to fight against the 
aggressors, and finally they were commanded 
to fight against all polytheists.65 Furthermore, 
Qutb rejects any other understanding of the 
concept of jihad in Islam, describing those 
who say “jihad is a defensive war” as “narrow-
minded” and “treacherous Orientalists.” He 
also believes that “striving through sayf 
(sword) is to clear the way for striving through 
preaching.”66 
Justifying jihad against believers is 
evidence that the concept of takfir, as used by 
contemporary Islamists, is not new. It apparent 
from the above that al-Mawardi and Ibn 
Taymiyya legitimized war against believers by 
labelling them “innovators,” “rebels,” or 
“brigands.” The difference between 
traditionalists and contemporary Islamists is 
presumably the accused group’s position 
within the state. In early Islam, such groups 
were normally in opposition to the state, but 
today the accused groups normally support the 
state--and sometimes are the state itself. 
This is the possible explanation for al-
Banna and Qutb both calling for jihad against 
authorities. Indeed, Qutb adopted the extreme 
view that the nation of Islam ceased to exist 
once Muslims submitted the governance of his 
affairs to men. He argued that as long as a 
society does not live by the Shari’a, it is in a 
state of jahiliyya (ignorance), even if its 
members believe in God and observe the 
rituals of worship.67 The influence of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s accusation against the Tatars 
provided Qutb with the ingredients to reject 
Egyptian society. Another similarity between 
traditional and neo-Islamists is that both 
groups have specified the stages of jihad, 
which they define as follows: first, an 
invitation to embrace Islam; second, if the 
invitation is rejected then jihad needs to be 
undertaken without warning; and third, they 
should be fought until they either convert to 
Islam or accept to pay jizya (poll tax). 
 
The Status of Women and the Status of Non-
Muslims 
 
To identify links in the approaches and 
understandings of traditional and 
contemporary Islamists in regard to women’s 
rights is a difficult task, because traditionalists 
rarely mentioned this issue. Their silence on 
the subject may have been because it was not 
considered a matter worthy of comment or 
because they took for granted a subordinate 
status for women and did not feel any need to 
justify it. Either way, this can be understood 
best if it is considered in its historical context, 
for the world then was a man’s world only. In 
considering this matter, the status of non-
Muslims will also be discussed to further 
highlight similarities between both traditional 
and neo-Islamist standpoints. 
Traditional Islamists: Al-Mawardi argues 
that it is possible for a non-Muslim to hold 
high office (such as vizier, minister) in an 
Islamic state as long as his duties are of the 
tanfiz (executive) category.68 However, Ibn 
Taymiyya had a different view; as a strict 
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follower of salaf, he demanded the application 
of the regulations set by Umar (the second 
caliph, r. 634-644), which barred non-Muslims 
from any political or military positions.69 In 
fact, most traditionalists, such as al-Ghazali 
and Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Ibn Jama’a 
(1241-1333), stressed that the requirements for 
being a caliph or imam are to be male and a 
Muslim.70 In other words, the caliph should 
not be a female or a non-Muslim. This is as far 
as women’s status and rights were defined, 
however, as noted above, non-Muslims were 
certainly not treated equally and were required 
to pay jizya as the price for their protection by 
the Islamic government. For example, Abd al-
Wahhab asserts that if non-Muslims refuse the 
call of the Muslim Commander to Islam, he 
must order them to pay the jizya or else fight 
them.71 
Contemporary Islamists: Mawdudi argues 
that Islam seeks to eliminate discrimination 
based on color, race, nationality, blood, and 
lineage; but on the question of religion, he 
divides human beings into two parties: “the 
party of God” who are Muslims, and “the 
other party” who are non-Muslims.72 In 
addition, he says that Islam prescribes two 
types of citizenship: Muslims and dhimmis 
(non-Muslims), and only Muslims have the 
right to hold “the post of the head of the 
Islamic state,” to be a “member of 
parliament,” or to occupy “key positions.”73 
Moreover, Mawdudi and Zedan name those 
who are not eligible to vote in an Islamic state, 
and they include non-Muslims with children 
and the mentally ill.74 It is relevant to point 
out that Zedan uses the term “crazy” in place 
of “mentally ill,” and in so doing he thus 
categorizes non-Muslims with “crazy” people. 
Al-Banna suggests that the authority of a 
Muslim state should not be entrusted to non-
Muslims, because this would enable them to 
gain general power.75 
The Islamist view on non-Muslim 
participation in parliament is similar to the 
view on women, whom they consider to be 
second-class citizens unworthy of holding any 
leading political post, such as that of president 
or prime minister. They insist that 
parliamentary seats for both non-Muslims and 
women should be limited in number, and that 
non-Muslims should be excluded from judicial 
matters.76 For contemporary Islamists, 
women’s main responsibility is to bring up 
children, as suggested by Qutb, and if a 
society permits women to work in a job 
outside the home then that community should 
be considered jahiliyya.77 
Under the pressure of current changes in 
the Islamic world regarding reform and 
democratization, al-Qaradawi approaches the 
role and the status of women in society more 
diplomatically. He is aware that he cannot 
deny them basic rights, such as nomination to 
public office and government, but he still 
marginalizes them and limits other rights so 
that they remain second-class citizens in 
society. Al-Qaradawi’s view is that women 
should be allowed to be elected to parliament, 
but their numbers should not exceed those of 
men; as long as men have the majority they 
need not worry about women overpowering 
male authority.78 
As stated above, it is difficult to discern 
similarities between traditional and 
contemporary Islamists in regard to the status 
of women. However, contemporary Islamist 
denial of women’s rights could be linked to 
their disregard by traditionalists. Moreover, in 
relation to the status of non-Muslims, there are 
clear links between the views of the two 
groups as examined above. 
The significance of identifying the 
theoretical links and/or parallels between the 
ideologies of past and present Islamists is in 
showing to be incorrect the argument that 
Islamism is a new phenomenon, as proposed 
by Ayubi, Amin, and Tibi (see above), and 
that the process of politicization of Islam goes 
back to the first centuries of Islam, especially 
after the emergence of the first traditional 
extremists. 
 
EXTREMISM IN ISLAM: PAST AND 
PRESENT 
 
It is worth noting that not all Islamists 
(traditional or contemporary) hold extreme 
views. Following is an examination of this 
point, with particular focus on the most 
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prominent writers. The emphasis will be on 
three well-known traditional Islamists, Ibn 
Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. Of 
contemporary Islamists, the focus will be on 
the ideas of Qutb, by far the most extreme. 
The attention will be on two interesting 
influences on their extreme ideas, as a 
response to personal persecutions and 
invasions. 
 
Persecution of Islamic Thinkers and 
Extremism in Islam 
 
Throughout history the relations between 
Islamic rulers and ulama and jurists (including 
Islamists) have generally been good. The 
Islamists’ main political role has been to 
justify and legitimize the ruler’s authority.79 
However, there have been exceptions, and 
some Islamists have paid a heavy price for 
their beliefs and their political and theological 
standpoints, several suffering imprisonment, 
persecution, and torture. Such experiences 
seem to have had profound impacts on their 
views. 
Traditional Islamists: In 833, the Abbasid 
Caliph, Abdallah al-Ma’mun ibn Harun (786-
833), officially supported the theological 
doctrine of the creation of the Koran. The 
debate as to whether the Koran was eternal or 
temporal and created had led to fierce disputes 
and to the persecution of adherents of the 
opposing positions.80 The Mu’tazila, a Muslim 
theological sect influenced by the rationalist 
methods of Hellenistic philosophy, taught that 
God was an absolute unity admitting of no 
parts. This rationale was brought to bear on 
the problem of God’s word, the Koran, 
because the word is God and not a part of 
Him; that is, the Koran, as a written expression 
and thus a material thing removed from God, 
had to be created by God in order to be 
accessible to man. In contrast to this view, 
traditionalists, such as Ibn Hanbal, held that 
the Koran was uncreated and external, that it 
had existed along with God since the 
beginning of time. The debate led to the 
persecution of Ibn Hanbal and his followers. 
Hanbal was beaten and imprisoned by Abbasid 
authorities, though later released under 
pressure from his supporters.81 
Another prominent traditionalist was Ibn 
Taymiyya. Born in Harran in 1263, he lived 
through one of the most turbulent periods in 
Muslim history. At the age of six his father 
took refuge in Damascus after the community 
was displaced by Mongols. However, they 
were under constant threat, and internal 
dissent was destabilizing their religion. 
Repeatedly imprisoned because of his stance 
against invasion, he spent his last two years in 
jail, where he was actively involved in writing 
until deprived of pens and papers by his 
jailers.82 
More importantly, Ibn Taymiyya and most 
extremist Islamists were born into 
sociopolitical situations where Muslims in 
general, and Islamists in particular, suffered 
greatly. Ibn Taymiyya was born when the 
Abbasid Caliphate had just been defeated by 
Mongol invaders. At that time, the Muslim 
community suffered defeat and humiliation 
(see next section), and jurists and ulama were 
subjected to torture and imprisonment, 
especially those who called for the end of 
invasion--among them the leading figures Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. 
Contemporary Islamists: In relation to 
jihad, in Nahwa Mujtama Islami (Towards an 
Islamic Society), Qutb argues that “it is not the 
ambition of Muslims to oblige others to follow 
Islam, but its object is that Muslims should be 
free to preach Islam and let others have the 
freedom of belief.” In the same book, penned 
prior to his imprisonment and torture, he wrote 
that “the aim of jihad is to push away hostility 
without aggression.” He concludes that the 
general principle is “no war” and war is only 
“with attackers.” Furthermore, he stresses that 
Islam will not fight, boycott, or set itself 
against “polytheists.”83 
However, In Ma’alim fi al-Tariq 
(Milestones), he branded those who 
understood jihad as a “defensive war” as 
“narrow-minded” and “treacherous 
Orientalists.”84 It is clear from these lines that 
he had moved from a position of moderation 
to one of extreme intolerance and belligerence, 
especially regarding jihad. It is quite possible 
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that Qutb wrote Nahwa Mujtama Islami before 
his imprisonment and subsequent torture, 
because the language, tone, and approach to 
the concept of jihad is so profoundly bellicose 
in the later work. As a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1960s, Qutb suffered at the 
hands of the Egyptian authorities. Various 
witnesses reported the barbarism of the camp 
guards. Gilles Kepel writes, “It was then that 
he [Qutb] lost his last remaining illusion as to 
the Muslim character of Nasser’s [the 
Egyptian president] regime.”85 
The suppression brought far-reaching 
changes to Qutb’s ideology and in the means 
adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in their 
struggle with the Egyptian government. The 
example cited here is only one instance of the 
changes in tone and language in Qutb’s 
writings, and many others can be found by 
comparing his early and post-imprisonment 
works. 
Both traditional and contemporary Islamists 
might have been pushed further because of 
what they experienced at the hands of 
authoritarian rulers. Many are drawn to 
political violence, as Dr. Jerrold Post, a 
political psychologist pointed out, “not purely 
from ideological consideration but also 
through personal and psychological factors.”86 
 
Cultural and Military Invasion and 
Extremism in Islam 
 
In Muslim history there are many examples 
of Islamist resurgence, whether by 
communities or individuals. Individuals and 
nations respond differently to cultural and 
military invasion, but in Muslims it has 
engendered waves of extremism. 
Traditional Islamists: As a result of 
Mongol invasion and the collapse of the 
Abbasid Caliphate in 1258, religious 
institutions were destroyed and many jurists 
and ulama were either killed or dispersed.87 
Extremist Islamists view the destruction of the 
Abbasid dynasty as an important turning point 
in Muslim affairs. The significance of militant 
Islamic political thought which emerged in the 
wake of the Mongol invasion cannot be 
underestimated. Ibn Taymiyya dedicated his 
life to ending the Mongol occupation, and so 
obsessed was he that he declared jihad to be 
one of the pillars of Islam and more important 
than pilgrimage.88 As a cultural example, the 
Mu’tazila trend in early Islam was considered 
by Islamists to be a symptom of undesirable 
foreign influences on Islamic values and 
culture. 
Contemporary Islamists: Based on Ibn 
Taymiyya’s approach, al-Banna argues that 
“Muslims are under the yoke of foreigners and 
are subjugated by infidels” and “in such 
circumstances it becomes the duty of each and 
every Muslim to wage jihad.”89 It is 
significant to point out that leading 
contemporary Islamists, such as Mawdudi, al-
Banna and Qutb, lived in an era where most of 
the Islamic and Arabic world was dominated 
by Western powers. On the cultural front, a 
wide variety of examples can be cited, ranging 
from secular-oriented trends and movements 
(in some ways even Arab nationalism falls 
into this category) to Western films, books, 
and ideas about women’s rights. Perhaps, that 
is why al-Qaradawi says “social and cultural 
invasion is more dangerous and even worse 
than political and military invasion, because it 




Islamism is seen by some scholars as a 
reaction to modernism, Westernization, and 
industrialization, and therefore they argue that 
Islamism is a new phenomenon. By examining 
the views of Islamists from centuries ago--
something contemporary Islamist thinkers 
have certainly done--we see, however, that this 
movement is a new wave in an old continuum. 
Thus, contemporary Islamism is not a new 
phenomenon but one that has deep roots in the 
writings of traditional Islamists and in the 
experiences that both traditionalists and 
Muslim communities have encountered 
throughout history. 
There are also, some significant 
differences. The point of departure between 
traditional Islamists and new Islamists is that 
the former often called for total obedience to 
authority in order to avoid fitna (strife). 
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However, for the latter, authority is often 
perceived to be un-Islamic and so they view 
disobedience as a justifiable form of struggle 
against tyranny, despite the possible resulting 
strife. 
For traditional Islamists, religio-political 
affiliation was often within the framework of 
existing units of the schools of law, but for 
contemporary Islamists affiliation was often 
with organized political parties. Traditional 
Islamist movements were not sophisticated in 
terms of organization, however, contemporary 
Islamist movements are well-organized, 
sometimes clandestine, and usually better 
equipped both ideologically and logistically. 
This is the result of modern technology and 
methods--the internet being one key example--
which contemporary Islamists are quite 
willing to use. 
Further research would be quite useful to 
explore and identify differences between 
traditional Islamists and Islamists. 
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